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Abstract 
This paper examines emerging market multinational corporations’ (EMNCs’) 
knowledge transfer (KT) in emerging markets using case studies of Chinese MNCs (CMNCs) 
in Africa.  CMNCs are found to transfer “relevant knowledge”, existing knowledge 
reconfigured so that recipients can apply it more effectively with less effort in the new 
context. Relevance is ensured through recipients exerting ownership of the KT process, 
influencing what knowledge is transferred and how it is transferred. We summarize EMNCs’ 
KT process in a “relevant knowledge recipient ownership model”. The model contributes to 
KT theory by refining and empirically testing a new type of knowledge - relevant knowledge 
- and a new transfer model - recipient ownership - associated with EMNCs. It leads to a 
“relevance-based view” in which EMNCs’ competitive advantage in emerging markets is 
significantly enhanced by knowledge relevance rather than superiority. This contributes to a 
better understanding of EMNCs’ competitiveness in emerging markets as created from 
distinct characteristics of their relevant knowledge (applicability, assimilability, affordability) 
and recipient-driven transfer (selection, scrutiny and synthesis).  
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1. Introduction  
This paper addresses the under-researched topic of knowledge transfer (KT) by 
emerging market multinational corporations (EMNCs) in emerging markets. Emerging 
economies have, mostly through the operations of EMNCs, become significant outward 
investors, accounting for 35 per cent of global foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows in 
2014, up from just 13 per cent in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 5). Many EMNCs, especially 
Chinese MNCs (CMNCs) are investing heavily in low-income emerging countries including 
those in Africa - targeting sectors most in need of development, including infrastructure, in 
ways that promote South-South investment flows (UNCTAD, 2015). Until now, the 
knowledge management of MNCs’ moving into and out of emerging markets has been 
neglected in both KT and international business (IB) research (Lahiri, 2011; Peng et al., 
2010). MNC engagement in Africa, in particular, remains “under-researched in the fields of 
management, organization studies, human resources and international business” (Kamoche, 
2011, p. 1). 
The way EMNCs internationalize to compete in the global arena has been a focus of 
recent IB research (Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008; Kundu & Merchant, 2008; Lahiri, 2011; 
Contractor et al., 2007; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo & Child, 2015). 
However, studies to date have largely focused on why and how EMNCs strategically acquire 
knowledge that they lack (Mathews, 2002; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008), not on their 
transfer of knowledge that they have acquired or created. To account for EMNCs’ increasing 
ability to compete in foreign markets when lacking firm-specific assets, IB analyses 
associated with the resource-based view (RBV) and knowledge-based view (KBV) of firm 
growth generally argue that EMNCs assemble and manage externally-acquired strategic 
assets (Rui & Yip, 2008; Chittoor et al., 2009).  
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These approaches, mainly adapted from studies of developed-country MNCs 
(DMNCs), may be appropriate for understanding how EMNCs defended themselves when 
DMNCs entered their home markets, and how they were initially able to use cost advantages 
to enter DMNCs’ home markets, where they acquired new knowledge. They are, however, 
inadequate to explain the recent strong and sustained expansion of EMNCs’ outward 
investment and their growing role as suppliers of knowledge to emerging markets. Recent IB 
research has argued that EMNCs can achieve advantage in emerging markets through 
combining ordinary resources based on their more detailed familiarity with special 
requirements, resource restrictions and institutional limitations in the host country (e.g. 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo & Rui, 2009). At their present early stage, however, 
these claims lack detailed insight into the processes of EMNCs’ creating and transferring 
knowledge to other emerging markets, and have yet to receive much empirical assessment. 
Little has been reported about how EMNCs manage the simultaneous acquisition of 
knowledge in high-income markets and transfer of knowledge to low-income emerging 
markets; how they fill the “gap” between knowledge acquired and knowledge required; or, 
above all, what EMNCs’ knowledge is and how they transfer the knowledge to overseas and 
make advantage from it.  
KT theory has also paid little attention to EMNCs as knowledge providers, its focus 
remaining on DMNCs as possessors of superior knowledge and best practice (Edwards & 
Ferner, 2004) that enable their expansion abroad. DMNCs’ KT to emerging markets was long 
defined as “forward diffusion” (Edwards, 1998), in which they act as “teachers” instilling 
knowledge into learners who lack it (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009). This one-way 
characterisation of KT is less obviously appropriate to emerging markets, since knowledge 
that is valuable to the source (the provider) requires more adaptation to the  needs of the 
recipient before it can be useful to them (Liyanage et al., 2009, Zahra & George 2002). 
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Technologies used in high-income markets have often proved to be inappropriate when 
transferred to lower-income countries, as they make excessive demands on local 
infrastructure, capital or skills supply (Schumacher, 1973; Kamoche, 2000).  
KT is particularly important in the context of emerging markets because they tend to 
have limited availability of management and technical skills (Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; 
Shrestha et al., 2008), and the accumulation of these skills is a key determinant of economic 
growth (OECD, 2013). In sub-Saharan Africa, whose population is projected to rise from 970 
million in 2013 to over 2 billion by 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 2013), 42.7 per cent 
of had an income of less than $1.90 per day in 2012 at 2011 Purchasing Power Parity (World 
Bank, 2015). While FDI by MNCs is an important channel for the transfer of new 
technologies and materials, production methods, and organizational and managerial skills 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008), it is frequently reported that knowledge transferred by inward 
investor has been ineffective in Africa and other emerging markets (Jackson, 2004, 2012; 
Kamoche, 2011). The main reasons include the emerging-market recipients’ limited 
absorptive capacity (Cavusgil et al., 2013) and DMNCs’ lack of understanding of their very 
different economic and institutional conditions (Hofstede, 2007). Competing within emerging 
markets and internationalizing out of these markets require strategic choices that are markedly 
different from those prescribed in traditional models of MNC behavior (Aulakh & Kotabe, 
2008; Kundu & Merchant, 2008; Contractor et al., 2007; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Luo & Tung, 
2007). In Africa, varying colonial patterns have added to an already wide diversity arising 
from geographical, historical, economic and social–political contexts (Kamoche, 2000, 2011).  
This paper tackles the shortfalls in both IB and KT research streams by addressing 
two research questions. Firstly, what kind of knowledge have EMNCs transferred to emerging 
markets? Secondly, how do EMNCs transfer knowledge to emerging markets? Our research 
found that CMCNs achieve competitive advantage by transferring what we term “relevant 
 
 
5 
knowledge”, through a form of interaction that we characterise as “recipient ownership”. The 
resultant “relevant knowledge recipient ownership model” contributes to KT theory by 
describing and explaining the new type of knowledge and its distinct form of transfer 
associated with EMNCs.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature relevant to 
EMNCs’ knowledge transfer and sets up our research questions. Section 3 explains our 
research design. Section 4 presents findings on what knowledge CMNCs was transferred to 
Africa, how this knowledge was transferred, and how CMNCs achieve competitive advantage 
from their KT. Finally, Section 5 discusses the main characteristics of EMNCs’ relevant 
knowledge and recipient ownership. We do this by distilling the findings into propositions 
whose generality can be tested in future research. 
2. Literature review 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences 
and information (Davenport & Prusak, 1998, p. 5). It comprises information, technology, 
know-how, and skills (Grant, 1996a, p. 377). Knowledge transfer (KT) is the systematically 
organized exchange of information and skills between people or business units. It involves 
providers actively communicating to others what they know, and/or recipients actively 
consulting others in order to learn (Liyanage et al., 2009).  
Conventional KT theory, while recognising that provider, recipient, nature of 
knowledge and transfer mechanism are all important for transfer (Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Polanyi, 1966; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), still views the provider’s knowledge base as 
central to success. The knowledge transferred by DMNCs is often described as “superior 
knowledge” or “best practice” (e.g. Martin & Beaumont, 1998; Edwards & Ferner, 2004), and 
the possession of superior knowledge is viewed as central to their success in new markets 
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(Hymer, 1976; Kogut & Zander, 2003). “Superior knowledge” is generated close to the 
frontiers of research, delivers the highest labour- and multi-factor productivity and is 
demanded by the most advanced customers (Andrews et al., 2015), and so arises first in the 
countries that lead the world economy. It is usually assumed to be advanced and cutting-edge 
technology or management practice, transferred from developed to emerging economies 
largely within MNCs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). DMNCs are widely held to have dominated 
global competition owing to their superior knowledge (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
 The “forward diffusion” model (Edwards, 1998) depicts the DMNC provider’s 
superior knowledge as giving them authority to decide what knowledge is transferred and to 
control the transfer process. This is particularly the case in DMNCs pursuing a global strategy 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Although DMNCs may modify their transferred knowledge to 
some extent in response to client or host-country need, recipient involvement is not usually a 
strategic intent for DMNCs (Yang et al., 2008). They instead adopt a teaching-learning model, 
featuring a linear transfer flow from units that are relatively knowledge-rich to units that are 
relatively knowledge-poor (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009). 
However, the advanced nature of DMNCs’ knowledge does not always allow 
successful KT in emerging markets (e.g. Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Zhang & Edwards, 
2007). The transfer can be impeded or blocked when the provider’s knowledge is of a level 
and type that recipients cannot readily absorb, leaving a “technological gap” between the 
provider and local firms (Kokko, 1994). If the transferred knowledge is too far ahead of that 
of domestic firms, effectiveness is compromised by recipients’ reduced ability to assimilate 
the knowledge (Kokko, 1994) or operationalise it (Grieve, 2004). While established KT 
theory suggests that recipients should improve their ability to absorb knowledge from 
DMNCs (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), and so improve the 
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effectiveness of forward diffusion, it has paid less attention to changes in the linear transfer 
model that improve the receipt of MNC knowledge.  
Evidence that the linear model does insufficient justice to the inherently social nature 
of the KT process (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009) has encouraged the development of 
social learning theory, which accentuates the situated and contextual nature of knowledge and 
learning (Fox, 2000). Research on organizational learning in MNCs also suggests that KT is 
essentially a social and interactive process rooted in spatial and relational proximity (Lam, 
2003; Porter, 1998). These re-appraisals have turned attention to the dynamics of interaction 
between home-based institutions and host country context.	Interaction between provider and 
recipient enables them to “transform” knowledge so that recipients find it useful and are 
motivated to acquire it (Nonaka & Tageuchi, 1995; Zahra & George 2002); “translate” 
specialist knowledge into non-specialist terms accessible to those with a smaller or different 
knowledge base (Thorpe et al., 2011);  “codify” knowledge so that recipients understand its 
formal basis and can still apply and re-transmit it in the absence of the provider (Kotlarsky et 
al., 2014); or re-assessment by providers when preparing knowledge for transfer (Baert, 
2005). 
Building on these insights, a few researchers (e.g. Schulz, 2003; Yang, et.al, 2008) 
have moved beyond the conventional KT focus on providers’ possession of superior 
knowledge and linear transfer, and started to assess the importance of knowledge relevance to 
its transfer. Schulz (2003, p. 442-3) defines knowledge relevance as “the degree to which 
external knowledge has the potential to connect to local knowledge”, this potential depending 
on the extent to which external knowledge “has new implications for prior local knowledge”. 
While radically different and superior knowledge might appear to have the most implications 
for recipients, its lack of connection can restrict recipients’ capacity to absorb, apply and 
integrate it with their existing knowledge. Schulz (2003) likens the combination of relevant 
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new knowledge with existing knowledge to a “lock and key”, producing transfers that enable 
wider and more effective application of what the recipient already knows, as well as adding 
new knowledge in readily usable form.  
The motivation for transferring knowledge increases with its relevance to users, since 
this raises the return on recipients’ investment in knowledge acquisition and (by ensuring that 
recipients are receptive to it and gain from it) the return on providers’ investment in 
knowledge transfer (Grant, 1996a). Schulz (2003, p. 454-5) finds the relevance and 
transferability of knowledge to be significantly determined by (1) the degree to which 
knowledge is “codified” and can be transferred by formal instruction; (2) the quality of 
informal relations between knowledge provider and recipient; and (3) the extent of two-way 
knowledge flow, through which recipients help providers to learn as well as learning from 
them. Conversely, the effectiveness of knowledge transfer is not significantly related to the 
volume of knowledge held by either the provider or the recipient.  
These discoveries imply that superiority of knowledge may inhibit rather than enhance 
KT, whose success relies instead on the way that knowledge and its mode of transfer are 
adapted for relevance to a new context. They also suggest that EMNCs may be able to operate 
successfully in emerging markets, despite lack of superior knowledge, because of a smaller 
gap between their home and host country conditions, and greater success in bridging that gap. 
This is in contrast to analyses built on the RBV, which emphasizes possession of superior 
strategic resources as a necessary condition for the firm’s competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991) and the KBV (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996b) which identifies 
superior knowledge as an especially important resource. Both theories lead to a 
characterization of EMNCs as disadvantaged by a lack of strategic resources. EMNCs are 
portrayed as limited in their ability to transfer knowledge (Gullien & Garcia-Canal, 2009), 
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underdeveloped in their management capabilities and decision-making processes (Lyles & 
Baird, 1994) and in greater need of legitimacy (Hitt et al., 2000).  
To the extent that EMNCs are found to competing in foreign markets without strategic 
resources, the RBV and KBV usually explain this by the way they assemble and manage 
externally-acquired assets, obtained ultimately from DMNCs which they ally with  (Mathews, 
2002), imitate  (Chittoor et al., 2009), or directly acquire (Rui & Yip, 2008). This approach 
can account for the way EMNCs first responded to the arrival of DMNCs in their domestic 
markets and entered some North American and European markets, mainly through acquisition 
(Rui & Yip, 2008). However, the RBV/KBV approach is less easily applied to those EMNCs 
that have recently stepped up their involvement in emerging markets and become major 
investors there (UNCTAD, 2015). Some EMNCs have become important suppliers of 
knowledge to emerging markets while simultaneously acquiring knowledge in high-income 
markets, making their KT as important as their knowledge acquisition and integral to their 
overall knowledge management strategy.  
Recent IB research has argued that EMNCs can achieve advantage in emerging 
markets through combining ordinary resources based on their more detailed familiarity with 
special requirements, resource restrictions and institutional limitations in emerging markets 
(e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo & Rui, 2009). The “composition-based view” (CBV) 
(Luo & Child, 2015) advances IB research by explaining why some EMNCs might succeed in 
global markets while lacking strategic resources. The CBV argues that EMNCs can identify, 
leverage and combine ordinary resources (external and internal) to create a competitive 
advantage. This extends the KBV, finding potential advantage in a firm’s “combinative 
capability to synthesize and apply current and acquired knowledge” (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 
p. 384). It also builds on the “absorptive capacity” perspective, which emphasizes a firm’s 
ability to value, assimilate and apply new knowledge to gain and sustain a competitive 
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advantage (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). While the KBV and absorptive 
capacity approaches focus on knowledge as a special resource, the CBV focuses on the 
combination of ordinary resources, whose integration can provide a superior competitive 
offering even if none is individually unusual (Luo & Child, 2015).  The CBV highlights the 
possibility that EMNCs’ management and adaptation of knowledge during transfer, especially 
to emerging markets, may be a source of “compositional” advantage attained without superior 
knowledge. 
Little has been done to test these implications, however, due to neglect of EMNCs as 
knowledge providers (with few exceptions, e.g. Zhang et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2009).  The 
expanding number and international engagement of EMNCs gives a chance to investigate two 
research questions. Firstly, what kind of knowledge have EMNCs transferred to emerging 
markets? Secondly, how do EMNCs transfer knowledge to emerging markets? 
3. Research design  
3.1 Case selection   
Chinese MNCs (CMNCs) in Africa’s infrastructure sector were selected as case-
studies. Africa’s lack of infrastructure has been a serious obstacle to its economic 
development. Three decades ago, China faced comparable challenges in infrastructure. Today 
China’s has been visibly transformed while Africa’s has not (Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 
2010), despite Africa receiving proportionally more foreign aid (Easterly, 2006). It has been 
argued that China’s main benefit from foreign aid was the influx of new ideas, the opening of 
its mindset and the dissemination of knowledge (NDRC, 2009). China also acquired rich 
knowledge by taking ownership of the knowledge transfer from international organisations, 
identifying what it needed to learn and the best international donors and investors to fulfil 
these needs (China DAC Study Group, 2011). China’s infrastructure improvements and 
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methods of learning from DMNCs are aspects of its experience that many African countries 
are keen to copy (China DAC Study Group, 2011).  
Against this backdrop, China has since 2000 become the largest international financer 
and constructor of infrastructure in Africa (MOC, 2013; Schiere & Rugamba, 2011). While 
the potential host-country benefits of Chinese-financed and implemented projects has been 
recognised (Foster, 2009), concern has been expressed over what knowledge has been 
transferred and its potential impact (Kamoche & Siebers, 2015; Banks et al., 2013). A cluster 
of African countries including Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria and Angola have 
experienced average annual GDP growth rates of 5 to 10 per cent since 2000, an expansion 
that has been promoted by, and is generating more demand for, infrastructure development 
(UNCTAD, 2015). These fast growing economies have together received no less than 70 per 
cent of China’s finance for Africa’s infrastructure (Foster, 2009; Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). However, they vary considerably in their development stage, governance 
quality, resource endowment, society and culture. CMNCs engaged in African infrastructure 
development are therefore an appropriate focus for assessing what knowledge CMNCs have 
been transferring to Africa and how the knowledge has been transferred. 
3.2 Data collection  
The data in this paper were mainly selected from the first author’s large ongoing 
project entitled “China’s outward investment and Chinese MNCs”. Running since 2005, this 
project deploys a multiple case study methodology on Chinese firms operating around the 
world in all industries. Over 100 case studies have been conducted to date. For this paper we 
use the data collected from 19 Chinese MNCs which carried out infrastructure projects in 
Africa between 2008 and 2015. More than 80 per cent of the Chinese firms in Africa are state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) (Alden, 2007). Reflecting this, our case-studied CMNCs in 
infrastructure were predominantly SOEs, with just two of the 19 cases (C16, C18) privately 
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owned. Basic background information on the case companies and interviewees is given in 
Table 1. As the primary information source, the first author interviewed 85 people involved in 
African infrastructure development. Tables 2-5 summarise the main interview questions and 
responses. 
Table 1 is about here. 
Data for each case were collected from documentation, fieldwork observations and 
interviews. We firstly reviewed the existing literature and openly accessible materials to 
better understand infrastructure development in Africa. We also assembled archival data 
stored by international and national organisations in Africa and China including the World 
Bank, OECD, Ministry of Commerce (MOC) of China and China Exim Bank. During the 
fieldwork and interviews, we collected annual reports, market analysis, project management 
reports and publications of relevant industrial associations, our documentation materials 
running to more than 3,000 pages.  
Extensive efforts were made to ensure impartial, comparative and comprehensive 
data. Interviewees were guaranteed anonymity, and assured that the research was solely for 
academic use. As shown in Table 1, we included interviewees from both Chinese and African 
sides, and from international organisations. Interviews with the Chinese participants focused 
on their perspective on CMNCs’ knowledge transfer. On the African side, the interviews 
focused on the local perspective on CMNCs’ knowledge characteristics and the strategy and 
capability for enhancing knowledge transfer from CMNCs to local recipients, including 
domestic firms, individuals and government organisations. Case studies and interview 
questions were designed to permit comparison between CMNCs and DMNCs in the same 
country and sector. CMNC respondents were asked to compare their company’s knowledge 
characteristics to those of the DMNCs also operating in the country. We obtained 
comparative perspectives from officers of international organizations (such as the African 
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Union) and host governments, project owners and others with experience both of CMNC and 
DMNC projects. Where possible, we also interviewed managers of DMNCs in the same host 
country. 
Data were collected between 2008 and 2015, a period which saw significant changes 
in strategy both of knowledge providers and recipients. For example, in 2008 it was rare to 
find either CMNCs or host governments with a specific knowledge transfer arrangement. In 
2013 and 2014, countries like Tanzania and Ethiopia were working more actively to compel 
CMNC knowledge transfer, with dedicated government departments, detailed plans and 
practical transfer schemes. CMNCs had grown more receptive to the need for KT, to enhance 
corporate reputation and competitive advantage. The time-interval of data collection has 
therefore benefited the study, showing the evolution of CMNC knowledge transfer processes. 
Closer analysis of these changes shows a consistent trajectory towards the “recipient 
ownership” model we identify.  
3.3 Data analysis 
The case study methodology described in Yin (2008) and Eisenhardt (1989) was used 
to analyze the knowledge transfer involved in the case studied infrastructure projects. We 
applied data reduction techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1984) guided by the two research 
questions, to identify the features of knowledge and its transfer mode that appeared 
recurrently. This identified the factors of greatest relevance to the content, features, 
mechanisms and impacts of knowledge transfer. We then compared and contrasted the factors 
in each case, and mapped out the common knowledge contents, characteristics and transfer 
mechanisms. The findings have been summarised to populate the model developed, showing 
the interactions between variables and moderators. To ensure reliability and validity in the 
data analysis and findings, double coders from IB and KT backgrounds carried out the 
analysis independently. We checked for research effects, triangulated from different sources 
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and coders, weighted the evidence, made contrasts and comparisons, used extreme cases, 
checked out rival explanations, looked for negative evidence and obtained feedback from 
previous interviewees. Follow-up interviews were used to ensure that interviewees agreed our 
description of CMNCs’ knowledge and its transfer features. Finally, we compared and 
contrasted the case study results with existing theoretical arguments (reviewed above), which 
predominantly feature DMNCs’ superior knowledge and the forward diffusion transfer 
model. Inductive analysis of the data enabled us to refine the emergent “relevant knowledge 
recipient ownership model” described in section 5.1.   
4. Findings: knowledge transfer of Chinese MNCs in Africa  
This section first presents selected cases of CMNCs in sub-Saharan Africa to provide 
some contextual information about their knowledge transfer in 4.1. It then addresses the two 
research questions respectively in 4.2 and 4.3, assessing what knowledge CMNCs transferred 
to Africa in terms of its category, origin and characteristics, and how the knowledge was 
transferred in terms of methods and transmission channels. The distinctive process and 
outcome of this KT are associated with an effectiveness that identifies it as a source of 
competitive advantage for CMNCs, through ways that are outlined in 4.4. 
4.1 Case studies  
Five companies (coded C9, C14, C16, C3 and C4) can serve to illustrate the variety of 
contexts in which the research questions were investigated. While they entered sub-Saharan 
Africa at different times with contrasting motivations and projects, all required a substantial 
transfer of knowledge to their African operations. 
C9 was an example of a CMNC offering a technically low-end solution at lower price 
(than available from DMNCs) to meet the host country’s immediate demand for electricity, 
although it was simultaneously offering high-end solutions on many projects elsewhere in the 
world. In 2008 C9 won a US$175 million build-operate-transfer (BOT) project in Sudan by 
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offering a package including a low interest loan from China’s Exim Bank, design from a 
Chinese institute, power equipment from a top domestic firm (which had acquired technology 
from DMNCs including GE and ABB), and a top Chinese construction firm. The British 
supervisor hired by the project owner (IV84) criticised the Chinese for designing such small 
and outdated power plants for Sudan, arguing that this wasted resources and that Chinese 
lenders should stop financing them. He also voiced doubts about quality, pointing out where 
equipment did not fit due to design problems. Confronted with these criticisms, the site 
manager (IV20) admitted that the design and manufacturing technologies of CMNCs were 
“not good enough”, but stated that “the British supervisor should be aware of the limitation 
on Sudan’s capacity to build large power plants set by shortage of capital, level of demand 
and lack of a compatible electricity network”. When this was cross-checked, the Chinese 
commercial counsellor in Sudan (IV63) observed that, “The power was cut off more than 
twenty times a day even in the capital. It would be nice for the general public to be able to 
access electricity as the first step”. Sudan’s foreign minister confirmed to us that, “By 2008 
Sudan had a foreign debt of US$27 billion [which was over $700 per capita]. With the limited 
funds we have, Chinese firms are more able to meet our demand by offering quick planning 
and financing and construction” (IV82). Other interviewees recalled that Sudan had 
previously commissioned Western firms to build environment friendly gas-fired power 
stations which ran at higher cost because the gas had to be imported. The newly built small 
plants could use heavy oil produced in Sudan, which polluted more than gas but saved 
significant amounts of scarce foreign exchange (IV63).   
C14 was an example of a CMNC offering the host country newly imported wind 
power technology from Europe, and the managerial know-how to install and run it. Despite 
rich wind sources and shortage of electricity, Ethiopia had made limited investment in wind 
power due to lack of funding and technology – commissioning only one previous project, by 
 
 
16 
a French company. C14’s wind power design capacity improved considerably after 2000, 
when Chinese firms begun acquiring the latest technology from Europe. During the learning 
process many Chinese firms like C14 “modified European wind power technology by finding 
alternative material and methods, and taking advantage of China’s lower manufacturing cost 
and faster delivery” (IV85). Today, “half of the world’s ten largest wind power equipment 
makers are Chinese, and they can produce most of the components except the axle-tree. 
Turbine blades made in China is much cheaper than Europe’s” (IV30). Like C7, C14 was able 
to win the African project by offering a package the hosts described as “attractive”: a low-
interest loan of US$117 million from Exim Bank, C14’s design, access to China’s 20 best 
blade suppliers, and a competitive construction team (IV30). The head of the Chinese 
subsidiary  (C14 IV30) recalled:  
“Before our first phase project, a French company had signed a wind power contract with Ethiopia. 
We started our project one year after they did, but completed one year earlier. Although their 
technology was better, their management was poor. For example, they did not realize until the 
construction began that they were unable to transport the fan blades to the north due to their being 
no available road. They had to construct a new road for the transportation. In addition, they lacked a 
work ethic. They kept taking a break while we worked overtime.”   
The Ethiopian government perceived that C14 had the practical knowledge to solve the 
host country’s specific problems. Asked what he meant by “practical” knowledge, the officer 
in Ethiopia’s Ministry of Water and Energy (IV79) explained that it was “knowledge that is 
not only less expensive but also more compatible with the general conditions of the host 
country, such as the lack of a sophisticated industrial supply chain for the most advanced 
technology and the lack of experience to apply scientific management systems”. Hence, the 
host government was determined to acquire full knowledge of the design, building and 
maintenance, for future independent operation (IV79). Extremely detailed knowledge transfer 
schemes were put in place.  
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C16 is one of the few leading CMNCs mainly relying on independent R&D rather 
than forming joint ventures with DMNCs, but their important influence is still acknowledged 
(Ren, 2006). By 2014 C16 was selling to 46 of the top 50 international carriers in 
telecommunications, but it remained cost-competitive in developing countries including 
almost all of Africa. In 2004 when it entered Cameroon, the country’s telecoms were 
dominated by France’s the MTA Orange, and suppliers Eriksson and Alcatel. “We asked 
ourselves, with what strategy can we have a market position? Our answer was that, we must 
become the Toyota of the telecoms industry - we do not aim for the best technology but the 
most practical technology. For example, we researched and produced generators using solar 
power because Africa is short of energy but rich in solar resources” (IV38). C16’s offer of 
lower cost, customised products, won it only two contracts in Africa between 2004 and 2009: 
“It was difficult as the existing DMNCs own 90% of the market… In order to convince the 
potential customers that our technology is good enough for what they required, we not only 
provided them with detailed data on what we have done in the past, but also brought many of 
them to China and elsewhere to visit our completed high performing, lower cost projects” 
(IV38).  
C3 and C4 used Chinese technical standards and know-how on using local alternative 
resources to meet the host-country need for rapid delivery and affordable cost in rail 
construction. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia must currently rely for all imports and 
exports on one major road from Addis Ababa to the port of neighbouring Djibouti, with 
journeys taking 2-3 days. The proposed railway would reduce the journey time to 6 hours, 
making it a priority project, for which China’s Exim Bank offered a low-interest loan of 
US$3 billion. C3 and C4 constructed half each. The senior railway officer in Ethiopia 
Railway Corporation (ERC) explained why CMNCs were chosen (IV80): “Our government 
spent years consulting worldwide experts and visiting railway sites in different countries. We 
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eventually chose Chinese technology and standards, not only because China provided loans to 
us, but also because the project will cost less and be delivered quicker, which we really value. 
… They also train our employees”. The importance of comprehensive knowledge transfer 
was emphasised in his statement that “We have a big plan to build a regional and sub-regional 
railway network of over 5000 kilometres by 2020. Value for money is most important. Also, 
this is the first project. We have a detailed knowledge transfer plan so that we learn 
everything from this and then rely less on foreigners for other railways” (IV80).  
C3’s project manager (IV8) reported: “Most pieces of equipment were transported 
from China as they were not available locally. But whatever exists locally, we use that”. The 
country’s high unemployment rate made local recruitment a priority. C3 used 8,521 local 
employees alongside 1,000 Chinese to construct 333 km of railway from Addis Ababa to 
Dawanle. C4 used 6,000 local alongside 800 Chinese to construct 370 km from Dawanle to 
Djibouti (C3 IV6, 7, 8; C4 IV9). At one site of C3 and C4’s project, we observed the local 
employees manufacturing rail tracks and piers, with one Chinese employee acting as trainer 
and supervisor at 5-meter intervals. When local employees had difficulties, the Chinese 
employee went ahead to demonstrate what to do. C3’s project manager (IV8) noted that 
“Local employees do not know how to stir cement or bond steel properly, which will affect 
the quality of rail tracks and piers. We asked the Chinese employees to demonstrate to skillful 
local employees first, and then the skillful ones will show the rest of the employees” (IV8)”. 
Local employees also learnt Chinese management methods, such as paying bonuses for hard 
workers and better performers and punishing latecomers. Rewarded employees were held up 
as role models, and  photos associated their achievement  displayed in a window near the 
main gate. Many of the local employees had reportedly become skilled in building houses or 
repairing machines, making them “highly employable for other jobs in society” (IV7, 8). 
4.2 What knowledge did CMNCs transfer to Africa?   
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These cases shed light on the categories, origin and nature of knowledge transferred to 
Africa by CMNCs.  
Types of knowledge transferred  
African local-context constraints recurrently cited by interviewees included the high 
unmet demand for infrastructure, severe shortage of finance, lower level of industrialisation 
limiting indigenous supply chains, limited supply of skilled labour despite a large, cheap 
general labour force, and inefficient institutions and bureaucracy (IV80,81,82,83). “This is 
the national situation [guo qing] in Africa: do more with less” (IV63, 68).  
Correspondingly, the knowledge transferred by CMNCs was commonly targeted to 
meet the immediate needs and demands of the host countries, within the limits of local 
conditions and strained budgets. CMNCs consistently transferred four categories of 
knowledge highly valued by local recipients:  
Technology: it is usually acquired from DMNCs and modified to the less-developed 
country context, termed “applied technology” by C16’s CEO. He claimed that C16 “has not 
had one single original product invention” and achieved its competitive advantages by 
“improving and integrating the functions and features of products invented by Western 
companies” (Ren, 2006, p.1). The key feature of applied technology is that it avoids 
incorporating all the available features to maximise output quality and labour productivity, 
but in so doing becomes easier or less expensive for developing countries to install and use. 
For example, C14 redesigned key components of European wind power technology to make 
construction and operation feasible in the Ethiopian context. C16 customised its telecoms 
network stations to use locally available resources and reduce operating cost.  
Financing knowledge: In all cases, CMNCs transferred knowledge of how to raise and 
manage project finance. Supplier credit (mostly from Exim Bank) was extended as part of a 
package, shaped by the CMNC borrower in light of host-country capability and need. The 
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procedure was typically described this way: “we search for potential projects. We talk to 
project owners about our idea of financing and execution. If the project owner agrees, we 
report to government department, which will prepare loan documentation and submit to China 
Exim Bank. The Bank will request materials from us which we submit. After that the Bank 
initiates its internal risk management assessment system. If the assessment is fine, the 
Ministry of Finance will sign agreement with the Bank” (IV3). Host-country project owners 
value this aspect of CMNCs’ knowledge because project finance has long been a bottleneck 
in their infrastructure programmes.  
Managerial know-how: it includes identifying alternative resources and methods to 
meet the needs of the project, and understanding its adaptation to local conditions. Along with 
new knowledge, CMNCs transferred the skills to modify existing methods or work processes 
to ensure that the new knowledge could be understood given the hosts’ existing knowledge 
base and applied given the constraints of local conditions. For example, C14 predicted the 
difficult local conditions for project implementation, its advance preparations helping it to 
complete the project faster than the French MNC. C9 scaled down its power plants to fit the 
locally restricted supply of capital and natural resources.  
Global market knowledge: CMNCs invariably brought up-to-date knowledge of 
international markets and supply chains and access routes to it. The scale of global migration 
of manufacturing to China has made it an information centre on the demand and supply of 
goods and services for emerging markets. The typical CMNC attitude is that, “whatever 
required in this market, I am almost always certain that in which location the cheapest or 
suitable stuff exist. The logistics company do the rest as long as I place the order” (IV20, 34, 
14). Showing how this could be operationalized, C14 used 20 domestic firms to supply fan 
blades so that the host country was able to select the most appropriate quality and cost.  
Origins of transferred knowledge  
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The 19 case-study CMNCs acquired most of their knowledge from the home market, 
where they had worked with and learnt from DMNCs operating in China. Table 2 shows the 
most common answer for “how did you acquire the current knowledge?” is “learning from 
operations in China”, while there are also large contributions from “direct learning from 
DMNCs in China” and “indirect learning from DMNCs in China”. This study confirms an 
already-documented view (China DRC Study Group, 2011) that Chinese firms have adopted a 
“selective” and “ownership” learning approach when learning from DMNCs. That is, they 
chose what knowledge to acquire and controlled the learning process, based on their appraisal 
of local needs and conditions. For example, C14 acquired European wind power project 
knowledge, but adapted it to cheaper fan blades designed and made in China.  
Table 2 is about here. 
Characteristics of transferred knowledge  
The knowledge transferred by our case-study CMNCs was very different from that of 
DMNCs. Firstly, local interviewees often depicted the knowledge transferred by CMNCs as 
“not cutting edge but more practical and contextually specific” (IV71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80). 
They acknowledged that the technology involved in projects financed or conducted by 
CMNCs was often not the most advanced one available in global market. The gap between 
the CMNC and DMNC knowledge was widely acknowledged by the Chinese interviewees: 
“Compared to DMNCs, we lag behind in key technology and equipment. For the equipment 
used in our projects, 80% were from China, 20% key equipment from the west. Our design 
lags far behind. Two bottlenecks are language and standard” (IV18).  
However, these cases also made it clear that the gap between the knowledge 
transferred by CMNCs and the most advanced available knowledge was often a deliberate 
choice, to ensure that local needs were met within the confines of host-country conditions 
(such as the small power plants in Sudan and the railway standard in Ethiopia). Adaption was 
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largely done for the purpose of reducing cost through an acceptable sacrifice of material or 
service quality and increased use of local labour, which also promoted local job creation. For 
example, Ethiopia cannot afford to hire foreign companies (DMNCs or EMNCs) to 
implement all the planned railway projects, so must ensure that the early projects give it the 
technical and managerial knowledge to run future ones largely on its own. This need for 
effective and low-cost knowledge transfer shapes the choice of technology, steering it 
towards one that is fit-for-purpose, easily acquired and compatible with the present 
infrastructure and skills base.  
Finally, CMNCs’ knowledge was presented in ways which promoted the recipients’ 
understanding and unassisted application. While this initially involved demonstration and 
“tacit” transfer in some tasks, it usually later entailed the more explicit presentation of 
knowledge in forms that recipients could “decompose”, record and analyse (IV71,75,80). 
African recipients were attracted by the recognition that much CMNC knowledge has been 
obtained and applied during China’s rapid recent development, confirming its effectiveness 
(IV80). Inviting African policy makers and managers to visit Chinese projects, while often 
motivated by the need to persuade them that appropriate knowledge and standards were being 
transferred, also helped to reinforce the transfer by giving recipients more direct exposure to 
knowledge and practices that CMNCs had recently derived from DMNC partners and 
competitors (IV81, 82, 83), an example of ‘inpatriate’ knowledge exchange whose 
effectiveness has been demonstrated (Reiche, 2011).  
4.3 How did CMNCs transfer their knowledge? 
African recipients’ awareness of the characteristics of  CMNCs’ knowledge made 
them keen to acquire it, but also concerned that it might have a negative impact or might not 
be effectively transferred. “Having recently acquired much of their knowledge from DMNCs 
and modified this for its own needs, CMNCs incur noticeably lower cost in re-transferring 
 
 
23 
their  ‘know how’ to Africa, whose countries are generally similar to many Chinese regions 
about three decades ago in terms of their development stage, conditions and challenges” 
(IV50). Recipients are, however, aware of the inferior quality of Chinese goods and projects 
supplied to Africa, compared to those available in higher-income countries. This led them to 
demand extensive interaction between the knowledge transferors and recipients in order to 
improve the transfer of tacit knowledge, and make more of it explicit. Host-country 
companies and governments were observed to seek a high degree of “ownership” so as to 
control the knowledge transfer.   
Recipients’ initiative  
In 2008, the Exim Bank Africa chief (IV58) explained to the first author how they 
selected projects to support with lower interest loans in different African countries, stating: 
“No outsider knows a country better than the host government. Hence, it is wise to let the 
Africans  choose the projects which suit the local demand and conditions best”. His claim was 
validated by an Ethiopian government officer who described how he and his colleagues 
negotiated with the Chinese companies on what the technology that the Chinese should 
transfer (IV80): 
“Although this [finance for constructing the railway] is coming as a loan [from Exim Bank of China], 
we will be paying for it. We have to agree on terms and conditions and so on…with this one, even in 
some of the technical issues, we have to debate, sometimes disagree, break out, come back again for 
further discussion. It has taken about 6, 7 months because it’s not a give and take”. 
Interviewees from recipient countries expressed how they felt about the difference between 
traditional and Chinese knowledge transferors in their transfer modality. One senior 
government officer in Ethiopia stated (IV79): 
“In the power sector, projects are mainly financed by the Chinese and Ethiopia and the knowledge 
transfer content can be negotiated. But if a project is financed by international organizations, the level 
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of knowledge transfer is hindered by a relative inflexibility in negotiation. They have one policy for the 
entirety of Africa”. 
Another interviewee (IV80) confirmed that knowledge transfer is most effective when there is 
local initiative and implementation of a concrete strategy to make the most from the foreign 
cooperation: 
“For technology transfer you need to identify what available technology is. Then, you assess its level, 
whether it is best in the world, best in somewhere or best in some characteristics; then you go for 
identifying the gap [between the available technology and yours]; then you select the technology which 
you assume there is a gap, … then you have to study the alternatives: how could I adapt this available 
technology. … We are a latecomer; we have to make advantage of the latecomer. I don’t need to go and 
dream to invent a wheel; I choose the best”.  
Guided by this detailed strategy, case-study CMNCs in Ethiopia all had obligations to transfer 
knowledge, as shown in the case of C3 and C4. We encountered similar government 
strategies on enhancing CMNCs’ knowledge transfer to locals in Tanzania (IV71), Kenya 
(IV75), Nigeria (IV69) and Cameroon (IV76). 
Recipients’ scrutiny  
African hosts exerted strong scrutiny and supervision over the transfer process. In the 
railway project in Ethiopia, where the Chinese standard had been introduced, the senior 
manager admitted that local people are “concerned about Chinese engineers’ lack of 
experience. They even question the map we use. Indeed for Chinese standard, they have ‘zero 
understanding’ (lin lijie)” (IV9). The host government indeed adopted a more concrete 
strategy to ensure the Chinese transfer their best knowledge (IV79): 
“Yes, Ethiopia accepted Chinese standards on road, railway and wind power projects. The Chinese 
standard is there. What works in China should be fine with us. But the problem is, you cannot 
construct below that standard. Stick to that standard. If your standard to dig a tunnel is 3 meters, then 
you do 3 meters. … There is a general guideline [to scrutinize the Chinese project]”.   
 
 
25 
The scrutiny would be impossible if recipients had no knowledge of what CMNCs had 
provided or would provide for them. Hence, formal training of local talents was the first step. 
The deputy head of C4’s railway project noted the knowledge transfer obligations placed on it 
via formal training (C4 IV9):  
“Our ERC contract has one article dedicated to capacity building. We need to report the proportion of 
labour force we are using, from unskilled labour to engineers, from the number of Chinese employees to 
local employees. Moreover, ERC has a dedicated Capacity Building Department. … We are training 12 
senior managers for ERC, all paid by us. Central and Southern China University provides distance 
education on railway management. In addition, Tianjin Railway Professional Technology College also 
offer training for Ethiopians, with 254 in the first batch. They were trained to become train drivers, 
maintenance workers, crew members etc”.  
However, formal training was far from sufficient. Under pressure to justify their use of 
modified technologies and practices, CMNCs entered a highly communicative, dialogical 
relationship with their African hosts even when cultural differences and tight timetables 
initially worked against this. The recipients often complained about the difficulty of 
understanding Chinese project management because “detailed documents to explain the 
project plan and process were not available, or the documents were in Chinese, which needed 
to be translated to English first and then the local language” (IV75,78,79,80). Almost all the 
interviewees, from CMNCs and host countries, observed that “the Chinese often know how to 
do but not how to teach” (IV11, 12). These reinforced the view and action of enhancing 
human interaction from both sides (IV79).  
Scrutiny was executed mainly through human interaction in which CMNCs hired local 
managers and employees to work with them shoulder by shoulder. The subsidiary head 
(IV31) described clearly how the human interaction was arranged: 
“Ministry of Energy of Ethiopia dispatched a lecturer of Addis Ababa University to be our project 
consultant, who brought a small team to the project site. For every step of our operation, he asked us in 
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detail what that step was and what the principle was behind that step. He then wrote down in detail into 
the handbook on the program of the operation, maintenance, principle, practice, and results verification.  
… If he was unable to understand, he would keep asking until he fully understood. Before that, he 
would not sign the ‘acceptance’ for us so that we were unable to proceed to next stage of the project, 
which severely delayed our progress”.  
Among the many mechanisms of human interaction we identified were visits to completed 
projects in China, participation of local supervisors in projects, site demonstrations to local 
employees, and other mechanisms shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 is about here. 
4.4 CMNCs’ attainment of competitive advantage from KT in Africa 
We have also found that CMNCs’ reconfiguring knowledge, so that it can be readily 
absorbed by recipients and fits with what they already know, makes a significant contribution 
to their competitive advantage in Africa. The importance of transferring reconfigured 
knowledge, so that it can be readily absorbed by recipients and fits with what they already 
know, is repeatedly demonstrated in our interviewees’ descriptions of the nature and 
characteristics of CMNC projects, and the way they drew on Africa’s local knowledge as well 
as supplementing and sometimes replacing it. Our research suggests that, while DMNCs also 
engage intensively in knowledge transfer to Africa, CMNCs have developed greater 
capability for viewing production and project-management challenges from the emerging-
market recipient’s perspective, and making appropriate adjustments in the content and 
process of knowledge transfer. This is found to be closely related to the contrasts between 
DMNCs and CMNCs regarding the role as knowledge provider, corporate strategies and 
relational proximity to recipients. 
In the role of knowledge provider, DMNCs have heavily invested in a transfer 
capability for advanced or superior knowledge that they originated or acquired from research 
and development in high-income countries. CMNCs are often simultaneously transferors of 
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knowledge (to emerging markets) and knowledge recipients (from DMNCs), reflecting their 
need to acquire already-invented technologies and associated skills before they could begin to 
develop their own. CMNCs have worked intensively with DMNCs within China since it 
began to open to trade and FDI in the 1980s, and then with local firms in host emerging 
markets since the early 2000s. As well as being more familiar with emerging market 
conditions, CMNCs are more alert to recipients' precise knowledge needs, and the importance 
of involving them actively in knowledge acquisition, because CMNCs’ own recent learning 
from DMNCs has already required adaption of knowledge for closer fit with their own 
conditions (e.g. Warner, 2014). One subsidiary head (IV30) noted that, “During China’s 
infrastructure development, Chinese firms also learnt from foreign firms. For example, there 
were 26 power generation units in the Three Gorges Dam. The Chinese government tied 
Dong Fang and HPEC with GE and Alsthom respectively to form a joint venture which made 
the first two units. Through this learning the Chinese firms made the other two units 
afterwards. We indeed understand the enthusiasm and need of Ethiopians for learning. We are 
also willing to teach them. We can do whatever is required such as training or even setting up 
a subject for their universities”.  
CMNCs are usually transferring knowledge in which they have few intellectual 
property rights, and which they have often recently codified themselves in the process of 
acquisition, so that they are easier to modify the knowledge further to meet the local 
requirement. Two senior managers of C17 explained why, in their company’s view, only 
CMNCs can bring relevant knowledge to Africa: “First, China’s market is massive and 
requires many firms to meet its demand. DMNC telecoms giants wanted to control it but 
failed. This enabled domestic firms to learn, to compete and to survive. Second, the market of 
a 1.3 billion population with high growth rate offered a natural experimental field for our 
technology. With trial and error, we improved. Third, China is so diverse and has many niche 
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markets, impelling us to develop customized products to meet local demand and conditions” 
(IV44, 45).  
Regarding corporate strategy, DMNCs are almost invariably first movers, arriving 
with original and proprietary technologies. This has often allowed them to occupy the leading 
market position in emerging countries, without much adaptation to local need. DMNCs do 
hold much knowledge that is of value to low-income countries, and tend to find it cost-
effective to modify their knowledge for the largest of these, where a strong internal market is 
expected to develop (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, our research shows that DMNCs’ 
strategies tend still to be focused on advanced technology, which they find inherently hard to 
adapt to countries in earlier stages of industrialisation, as in Africa. C16 in Ethiopia noted: 
“Nokia-Siemens operated here. They did not maintain network stations. They considered 
Ethiopia was not their ‘valuable market’. But for us, we do whatever to access the market” 
(IV43).  
CMNCs have adopted a different strategy towards Africa due to their non-superior 
knowledge, and later arrival both in high-income and emerging markets. All of our 19 case 
study CMNCs took  “base of pyramid” (BOP) countries or communities as their core market, 
even though many of them were also targeting developed country markets (and some such as 
C16 and C17 had advanced technology that made them top global players). CMNCs were 
aware that “the best recipients of China’s knowledge are developing countries undergoing a 
similar development stage” (IV67). In more detail, “the Africans turn to the Chinese 
knowledge as it is reachable [due to the relatively smaller knowledge gap]; the Chinese 
knowledge flows to Africa as it is worth most in Africa. That is why the two have an instant 
‘click’” (IV67). In Cameroon, the long presence of French and other DMNCs could have put 
them in pole position for the privatization process that began in 1994. But as the planning 
minister (IV81) observed, “French companies … don’t move their investment to our priority 
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sectors. That’s why we need to think about a new partner ... China can become such a 
partner”.   
While DMNCs were able to offer better quality goods and services at a higher price, 
African hosts sought an affordable price with an acceptable sacrifice of quality, which 
CMNCs were best placed to offer. For example, C9’s small power plants enabled host 
countries to build more plants than if the same sum were spent on more advanced plants, 
which were larger and more expensive. One CMNC subsidiary head explained: “While 
CMNCs improved their technology, learning from DMNCs and nationally imported 
technology and equipment in the 1980s and 1990s, DMNCs moved to a new stage targeting a 
higher margin by selling (1) intellectual property rights and design maps, (2) technical 
standards, (3) information and (4) technology platforms. Whoever guides the platform leads 
the industry. While such high-end solutions are controlled by DMNCs, what CMNCs can do 
is to choose the differentiation strategy, using our distinctive application capability to 
compete with them” (IV27).  
Turning necessity into virtue, CMNCs have learnt to use their ability to reconfigure 
knowledge as a distinctive capability for winning business and attaining competitive 
advantage in Africa. Kogut and Zander (2003) show how tacit knowledge can embody firm-
specific advantages that promote future expansion; our cases suggest that the ability to re-
codify tacit knowledge, to speed up its transfer to clients or subsidiaries in very different 
contexts, is an equally important capability at least for firms arriving late in already-crowded 
markets. Table 4 shows that CMNCs have already created competitive advantage through 
their more successful knowledge transfer strategies in Africa.  
Table 4 is about here. 
 CMNCs also take the advantage of relational proximity between China and Africa 
which is characterised by the similar development stage, being south-south partners, similar 
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institutional environment, without colonial history and the trust built since Chairman Mao’s 
regime from 1950s (IV67). In the past two decades, the considerable increase of China’s 
investment and official development assistance has challenged the West’s hegemony in 
Africa, encouraging China to play a decisive part in shaping the future of the continent (IV81, 
82).  
5. Discussion and conclusion: a “relevant knowledge recipient ownership model”  
This final section identifies EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets as the “relevant 
knowledge recipient ownership model”, outlining its distinctive content, generation and 
derived competitive advantage, and contrasting them with DMNCs’ superior knowledge. In 
moving to conclusions about EMNCs in general, limitations must be acknowledged to 
generalizability of evidence on CMNCs. There may be characteristics specific to CMNCs – 
including their domestic market size, close financial and political relationships with 
government, and advantages of scale, financing and foreign market access arising from these 
– which contribute to competitive advantage in ways not open to all the EMNCs. On the other 
hand, other EMNCs may be able to learn from CMNCs’ early experience, and may find it 
easier to establish conditions for relevance knowledge creation and recipient ownership, not 
least because they avoid various host-country suspicions concerning China, arising from its 
large size and need for cheap commodity supplies. The observation of relevant knowledge 
and recipient ownership in all our cases may imply that these are characteristics required for 
successful KT in emerging markets by any multinational, not just those from China. The 
extent to which CMNCs’ experience can be generalised to other EMNCs is a question for 
future research. The seven propositions set out below to allow each element of our argument, 
derived from CMNC evidence, to be tested on EMNCs based in countries other than China.   
5.1 A “relevant knowledge recipient ownership model”  
Our research findings indicate that the relevance of knowledge significantly 
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influences the extent and effectiveness of EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets. Relevance 
requires a bridgeable gap between provider’s and recipient’s existing knowledge: not so small 
as to deprive it of novelty, not so large as to make it incomprehensible to new users. We 
define relevant knowledge as the reconfiguration of existing knowledge to a new context, 
allowing recipients to generate more effect with less effort. Three recurrent characteristics of 
relevant knowledge were observed:  
Applicability: Knowledge is selected for flexible and cost-effective operation so as to 
deliver the required performance improvement while taking account of local limitations, e.g. 
on supply of managerial and labour skills, infrastructure, energy, components, materials and 
finance. The transferred knowledge is moved away from cutting-edge technology and best 
management practice to align it with locally-specific demands and bring it closer to a 
recipient’s knowledge base. This results in a modified version of the technologies and 
management practices invented in developed countries and transferred by DMNCs (Edwards 
& Ferner, 2004), and often involves “secondary innovation” devised or guided by recipients 
(von Hippel, 1994). Relevant knowledge conveys technology that is the most effective given 
the emerging-market recipients’ present resource constraints – in contrast to technology that 
is most effective under the (less severe) resource constraints of the developed economies in 
which most proprietary technologies originate.  
Assimilability: Narrowing the gap between existing and newly-arriving knowledge 
makes it easier to bridge: recipients can add to their current knowledge and capability without 
investing in significant new areas of learning, enabling them to act more effectively in their 
particular situation.  A dialogue between recipient and provider, contrasting with the one-way 
flow of instruction from teacher to student, allows both to identify what new knowledge is 
needed and proceed quickly to its transfer. Codification, transformation and translation 
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(reviewed in section 2) are among the processes that promote assimilability, whose 
effectiveness relies on the “recipient ownership” outlined below. Applicability and 
assimilability ensure that new knowledge substantially improves on any that is locally 
available, without undermining local operators’ power to manage and develop new 
commercial operations, and ultimately run and replicate them without external help.    
Affordability: Acquisition and implementation of knowledge are brought within the 
recipient’s limited financial means, partly as a consequence of greater relevance making it 
more applicable and assimilable than the superior knowledge from which relevant knowledge 
is derived. Keeping the costs of knowledge and its transfer within strict budget limits is 
especially important when (as in Africa) hosts must ultimately repay the loans from which 
most projects and equipment purchases are financed (Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). 
The affordability of knowledge is increased by improvements in applicability which increase 
its cost-effectiveness, and improvements in assimilability which reduce the cost of acquiring 
it, applying it and passing it on to others. Compared to superior knowledge, relevant 
knowledge entails lower costs of purchase, transfer, operation and expansion or replication, 
enabling recipients to “do more with less”. We summarise the characteristics of the “3As” in 
Table 5, supported by interview sources. 
Table 5 is about here. 
The observation that successful emerging market KT involves reconfiguration of knowledge 
for relevance, achieved through these characteristics (the ‘3 As’), gives rise to our first and 
second propositions: 
P1: EMNCs’ transfer of knowledge in emerging markets depends on reconfiguring 
existing knowledge for relevance to the new context.   
P2: The greater relevance of EMNC knowledge, compared to that previously 
transferred to emerging markets by DMNCs, consists mainly in its greater applicability, 
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assimilability and affordability. 
The achievement of knowledge relevance is promoted by permitting  “recipient ownership” 
of the transfer process. Recipients exert influence over what knowledge to transfer, how to 
transfer it and at what cost, forcing knowledge providers to adapt their acquired knowledge to 
local requirements. This turns EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets into an interaction between 
knowledge provider and recipient, with both contributing to the adaptation of knowledge so 
that it can work in the local context. Recipient ownership was observed to have three 
recurrent characteristics: 
Selection: Recipients are permitted to observe the knowledge held and applied by 
EMNCs, in China and other markets, and to identify the technologies, managerial techniques 
and know-how that are most relevant to them (e.g. African leaders visited established projects 
in China to ensure selection of the type of project and transfer model most appropriate to their 
countries). EMNCs are put under pressure to adapt their knowledge until it has sufficient 
relevance to ensure transferability. Recipients may also select the method of knowledge 
transfer to ensure effective learning at sufficiently low cost (as with Sudan’s formation of a 
refinery joint venture which pressured the CMNC to complete KT to its local counterpart in 8 
years).  
Scrutiny: Recipients observe EMNC operations in the host country to ensure that 
relevant knowledge is being transferred as agreed, paying especially close attention to the 
methods of transfer so that knowledge can be retained and re-used in the absence of the 
provider. Hosts’ demand for scrutiny was evident in constant interaction between corporate 
and government officials on-the-ground with EMNC workers and managers, even when these 
initially showed clear preference to proceed without continual inspection. We observed 
scrutiny following selection (as when Addis Ababa University faculties took on the role as 
project supervisor in the wind power project) and preceding selection (recipients observing 
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CMNCs’ previous projects within China and in other countries to ensure that they could 
select from the full range of available knowledge).  
Synthesis: Recipients take overall responsibility for combining newly-provided 
knowledge with what they already know, the success of this synthesis giving an immediate 
check on whether relevance is being attained. The new knowledge combinations yielded by 
this synthesis, and the KT experience that leads to it, lead to knowledge creation which 
benefits providers as well as recipients, strengthening EMNCs’ incentive to submit to host-
country selection and scrutiny.   
These three components of recipient ownership (the “3 Ss”) ensure that EMNCs adapt 
their knowledge to achieve relevance (characterised by the “3 As”) in the emerging-market 
context. The adaptations of providers’ knowledge achieved through recipient ownership are 
consistent with existing definitions of knowledge transformation, translation and codification 
(Nonaka & Tageuchi, 1995; Thorpe et al., 2011; Kotlarsky et al., 2014). But they highlight 
the greater importance, in the emerging market context, of recipients’ participation in the 
transfer.   
Providers’ repeatedly-observed submission to recipients’ requirements, allowing them 
to ensure these characteristics (the ‘3 Ss’) in the KT process leads to our third and fourth 
propositions:  
P3: EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets depends on adopting a recipient ownership 
approach.  
P4: Recipient ownership of KT promotes the relevance of knowledge mainly by 
enabling recipients to practise selection, scrutiny and synthesis of providers’ knowledge. 
 
Once established, the interaction between recipient ownership and knowledge relevance 
becomes mutually reinforcing. The recipient’s selection of knowledge, scrutiny of knowledge 
transfer and synthesis of received knowledge promote the relevance of that knowledge, and 
greater relevance makes knowledge easier to select, scrutinise and synthesise. For example, 
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the Ethiopian railway company’s selection of knowledge enabled it to check that it received a 
system whose technical effectiveness, managerial and labour skill requirements delivered the 
necessary performance within its budget, and whose knowledge arrived in a form that could 
later be replicated and re-transmitted without further EMNC or DMNC help. Interaction 
between provider and recipient, focused on what recipients currently know and need to know 
in order to make the project work, narrows the knowledge gap between the two - ensuring a 
choice of knowledge to transfer and mode of transfer that work to both sides’ advantage. 
When recipients “own” the new knowledge, and are assured of future gains from its use, they 
are given more incentive for knowledge acquisition, which keeps down the provider’s transfer 
cost. Exercise of ownership also helps recipients keep down the “cost of ownership” 
(acquisition and installation cost plus running cost); and it is this lower lifetime cost, ensured 
by knowledge relevance, that allows the EMNC to win and successfully implement the 
project. The mutual advantages derived from this transfer mode are summarised in our fifth 
proposition:  
P5:  Recipient ownership of KT promotes the provider’s capacity to adapt knowledge 
for greater relevance, and the recipient’s capacity and incentive to acquire the relevant 
knowledge. 
We also observed that recipient ownership in pursuit of relevant knowledge requires EMNCs 
to adopt a “knowledge mediation” role, in the dual sense of being an “intermediary” that 
channels knowledge derived from DMNCs to the recipient, and a “mediator” resolving 
differences between knowledge provider and recipient (Mariotti, 2011) using active 
contributions from both. The mediation role facilitates codification, as much EMNC 
knowledge has already been codified and clarified in the process of recently acquiring it. 
Under competitive pressure to acquire knowledge quickly (as latecomers), EMNCs have 
often selected it for relevance and reconfigured it for application in their home markets which 
simplifies emerging-market recipients’ own tasks of scrutiny, selection and synthesis when 
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the EMNC makes an onward transfer to them. The ubiquity and importance of this mediation 
prompts our sixth proposition: 
P6: EMNCs’ adoption of a knowledge mediation role facilitates the reconfiguration of 
knowledge needed to ensure its relevance. 
The creation and transfer of relevant knowledge can give EMNCs a unique source of 
competitive advantage in emerging markets, as shown in the last section and Table 4. 
Competitive advantage can be attained, even against competitors with access to superior 
technology, through adaptations of existing knowledge that make it more relevant to the host 
country context. By closely matching recipient needs, relevant knowledge raises the chance 
of successful transfer, and can have follow-on benefits for providers (for example, when 
targeting projects or product at low-income segments within higher-income markets). This 
advantage is greatest when the EMNC has gained access to superior technology but 
reconfigures this for relevance to the host, through the adoption of a mediation role under 
recipient-owned transfer. EMNCs’ deliberate use of knowledge relevance to win competitive 
advantage in emerging markets underpins what we call the “relevance-based view” of firm 
growth. It differs from the resource- and knowledge-based views, developed mainly from 
observation of DMNCs, under which firms achieve competitive advantage from exploiting 
strategic resource and/or superior knowledge. The evidence for this relevance-based view 
found in all our case-study observations and interviews leads to our seventh proposition:  
P7: EMNCs derive competitive advantage in emerging markets from the transfer of 
knowledge reconfigured for relevance to the new context. 
We characterise the EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets as following a “relevant knowledge 
recipient ownership transfer model”, represented in Figure 1. The base of the triangle (the 
bold line with two-way arrows), which is the focus of this paper, indicates that EMNCs’ 
relevant knowledge (P1) characterised by the 3As (P2) is created and transferred through 
recipient ownership (P3), involving the 3Ss (P4). The interaction between recipient ownership 
 
 
37 
and knowledge relevance becomes mutually reinforcing. The recipient’s selection of 
knowledge, scrutiny of knowledge transfer and synthesis of received knowledge promote the 
relevance of that knowledge, and greater relevance makes knowledge easier to select, 
scrutinise and synthesise. Hence, recipient ownership of KT promotes the provider’s capacity 
to adapt knowledge for greater relevance, and the recipient’s capacity and incentive to acquire 
the relevant knowledge, enhancing relevant KT (P5). The provider takes on the task of 
knowledge mediation (P6), responding to demands conveyed by recipient ownership and 
problems that arise during the KT process. Competitive advantage (P7) results from these 
interactions and the successful KT to which they lead; so it is shown as an outcome of the 
relevant KT.  
The two-way arrows emphasise that, although the direction of KT is from provider to 
recipient, companies and other organisations (and their employees) in the recipient or host 
country contribute substantially to the composition of knowledge that is transferred and to the 
design of the transfer process.  Achievement of relevance requires emerging-market recipients 
to show the EMNC what they already know and what they need to know, prompting the 
EMNC to re-appraise its own knowledge so as to transfer what is most relevant. By 
producing knowledge whose relevance facilitates successful transfer, these interactions 
ensure a return on the provider’s investment in supplying and reconfiguring knowledge, and 
the recipient’s investment in acquiring knowledge after guiding its reconfiguration. This 
highlights the fundamental difference between KT by today’s EMNCs and conventional 
diffusive knowledge transfer by DMNCs. 
Figure 1 is about here. 
The left and right sides of the triangle, illustrating DMNCs’ KT to emerging markets and the 
ultimate source of EMNCs’ knowledge, lie beyond the scope of this paper. The left-hand side 
indicates how EMNCs have adapted DMNCs’ superior knowledge for relevance enabling 
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transfer to their own and other emerging markets. This is why they can be knowledge 
mediators. The right-hand side acknowledges that the African countries in this study have 
also acquired knowledge directly from DMNCs; but the extensively reported problems in 
making that knowledge effective has limited such direct transfers, and steered later-arriving 
EMNCs towards adapting knowledge for relevance. The predominant flow in recent decades 
has been of relevant knowledge, reflected in the base of the triangle.  
5.2 Limitation and contribution  
This study makes use of extensive case study research on Chinese MNCs. These 
account for a large proportion of the present EMNC population, but may also differ 
(structurally and behaviourally) from non-Chinese MNCs. As explained in Section 4.4 and 
the beginning of this section, there may be factors that make CMNCs better placed than other 
MNCs to generate and transfer relevant knowledge through recipient ownership and 
knowledge mediation (such as domestic market characteristics and relational proximity with 
emerging markets). Further research is needed to assess the extent to which CMNCs’ 
experience – summarised in our seven propositions - can be generalised to other EMNCs.   
Despite this possible limitation, our study contributes to both management research 
and practice in a number of ways. For management practice, it provides timely and important 
evidence on EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets, now a key source of emerging markets’ 
knowledge acquisition whose scale and significance have only recently gained attention. For 
management research, our study advances theoretical frontiers in three main areas. First, our 
research contributes to KT theory by identifying a new type of knowledge - relevant 
knowledge - and a new transfer model - recipient ownership – associated with EMNCs. 
Relevance arises from adapting knowledge acquired in advanced markets to the more basic 
requirements of the host emerging markets, primarily through applicability, assimilability and 
affordability (the 3As). “Ownership” denotes recipients’ exertion of influence on what 
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knowledge to transfer and how it is transferred, primarily through selection, scrutiny and 
synthesis (the 3Ss). We thereby promote a shift in the focus of KT theory, from the current 
focus on DMNCs’ linear transfer of superior knowledge to EMNCs’ interactive transfer of 
relevant knowledge, and from recipients as passive learners to recipient-directed transfer. We 
advance the assessment of EMNCs as knowledge providers in emerging markets, looking 
beyond the longstanding focus in KT research on DMNCs as dominant sources of KT to 
emerging markets.  
Second, our study contributes to a better understating of the competitiveness of 
EMNCs, which is now a frontier topic in the study of emerging market firms, from both a 
theoretical and empirical perspective. Our study demonstrates a major and previously 
neglected process and mechanisms through which EMNCs achieve competitiveness in 
emerging markets, i.e. by adapting the knowledge they acquired from DMNCs and making it 
more relevant to the host country through the 3As and 3Ss. The relevance-based view moves 
beyond present perceptions of EMNCs’ competitiveness, which deny that they possess any 
significant strategic resource underpinnings, and assume them to depend on cost advantages 
only. It complements and helps to refine the composition-based view (CBV), supplying more 
detailed insight into how EMNCs compose and transfer their knowledge to other emerging 
markets. Our empirical findings allow us to go further, demonstrating why and how Chinese 
firms are particularly good at operating in emerging markets by reconfiguring ordinary 
resources into relevant knowledge to fit the specific demands and conditions of host 
countries.  
Third, the “relevance-based view” can also contribute to developing the CBV of 
EMNC growth, as an alternative to the RBV and KBV, which more appropriately characterise 
DMNC growth. According to the relevance-based view, it is less the superiority than the 
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relevance of the transferred knowledge to recipients that confers a firm’s competitive 
advantage and hence growth. Table 6 sets out how our study contributes to KT, IB and firm 
growth theories. 
Table 6 is about here. 
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Table 1 Selected case studied CMNCs and interviews 
  
Case Core businesses Intervi
ewees  
Information of the interviewee (IV) Year of 
the 
interview 
Venue of the 
interview 
1 Bridge, road, port 
etc  
IV1  
IV2  
IV3 
SH Kenya  
SH Ethiopia  
Senior manager Ethiopia 
2009 
2014 
2014 
Kenya, 
Ethiopia  
Ethiopia 
2  Airport construction, 
etc  
IV4 
IV5 
SH Kenya 
CEO of the parent firm  
2009 
2009 
Kenya 
China 
3 Railway design, 
construction, service 
etc 
IV6 
IV7 
IV8 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
Construction commander 
2014 
2014 
2014 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
4 Railway design, 
construction, service 
etc 
IV9 Senior manager Ethiopia 
 
2014 Ethiopia 
5 Water system, glass 
manufacturing, wind 
power 
IV10 
IV11 
IV12 
IV13 
SH Cameroon 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
Senior manager Tanzania 
2009 
2014 
2014 
2013 
Cameroon 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Tanzania 
6 Road, houses, 
shopping malls 
IV14 SH Kenya 2009 Kenya 
7 Dam, power plant, 
engineering etc 
IV15 
IV16 
IV17 
IV18 
SH Sudan 
CEO, Sixth Bureau  
Senior Manager Sudan 
SH Kenya 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Kenya 
8 Sport stadium, 
house etc 
IV19 SH Cameroon 2009 Cameroon 
9 Dam, power plant, 
machinery   
IV20 Site manager Sudan 2008  Sudan 
10 Dam, power plant, 
water  etc 
IV21 CEO of parent firm 2011  China 
11 Dam, power plant, 
house etc  
IV22 SH Ethiopia  2009 Kenya 
12 Design, construct 
and invest all 
infrastructure 
projects 
IV23 
IV24 
IV25 
IV26 
CEO of parent firm 
Deputy CEO of parent firm 
Senior marketing officer of parent firm 
SH Kenya 
2012 
2011 
2012 
2009 
  
China 
China 
Kenya 
Kenya 
13  Oil, gas and 
underground heating 
drilling  
IV27 
IV28 
IV29 
SH Kenya 
Site manager Kenya 
Site Manager Kenya 
2009 
2009 
2009 
Kenya 
Kenya 
Kenya 
14 Power plant design, 
construction, 
constancy 
IV30 
IV31 
SH Ethiopia 
Site manager Ethiopia 
2014 
2014 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
15 Power plant, 
transmission line, 
equipment supply 
IV32 
IV33 
IV34 
IV35 
IV36 
IV37 
 
SH Sudan 
Senior manager Sudan 
Senior manager Sudan 
Junior manager Sudan 
Senior manager of parent firm 
Senior manager of parent firm 
 2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2012 
2012 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
China 
China 
China 
16 Telecommunications  
electronic 
IV38 
IV39 
IV40 
IV41 
IV42 
IV43 
SH Cameroon 
Senior manager Cameroon 
Senior manager Kenya  
Senior manager Kenya 
CSR manager Tanzania 
SH Ethiopia 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2013 
2014 
Cameroon 
Cameroon 
Kenya 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
17 Telecommunications  
electronic 
IV44 
IV45 
IV46 
IV47 
IV48 
IV49 
 
Senior manager Kenya  
Senior manager Kenya 
CSR manager Tanzania 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
Senior manager Ethiopia 
2009 
2009 
2013 
2014 
2014 
2014 
Kenya 
Kenya 
Tanzania  
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
18 Establish industrial 
zone  
IV50 Senior manager Ethiopia 
 
2014 
 
Ethiopia 
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19 Oil extraction, 
refinery, 
petrochemical, oil 
transportation and 
related services and 
constructions  
IV51 
IV52 
IV53 
IV54 
IV55 
IV56 
IV57 
SH Sudan 
CEO of the Refinery  
CEO of the petrochemical  
Senior manager Sudan 
Senior manager Sudan 
Chief engineer Sudan 
Senior manager of the supply firm  
 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
  IV58 
IV59 
IV60 
IV61 
IV62 
IV63 
IV64 
IV65 
IV66 
IV67 
IV68 
IV69 
IV70 
IV71 
IV72 
IV73 
IV74 
IV75 
IV76 
IV77 
IV78 
IV79 
IV80 
 
IV81 
IV82 
IV83 
IV84 
IV85 
Africa chief, Exim Bank of China 
Sudanese officer negotiating with C18  
Senior officer of Sudan Ministry of Mineral and Energy 
Senior officer of Sudan Ministry of Finance 
Senior officer of Sudan Ministry of Trade&Investment 
Chinese Commercial Counsellor of Sudan  
Chinese Commercial Counsellor of Cameroon  
Chinese Commercial Counsellor of Kenya  
Chinese Commercial Counsellor’s PA Tanzania 
Chinese Commercial Counsellor of Ethiopia  
Chinese Ambassador, Tanzania  
Chinese Ambassador Nigeria  
Chinese consultant of Tazara  
Senior officer of Tazara  
Sudanese employee in a client firm of C15  
Sudanese employee in a rival firm of C15 
Sudanese employee in C15  
Kenya Road Authority  
Officer of Cameroon Ministry of Trade& Investment 
Dept Head of Ethiopia Ministry of Social Welfare  
Local technician of C14 
Senior officer of Ministry of Water and Energy 
Knowledge transfer department head, Ethiopia Railway 
Corporation  
Senior officer, Ministry of Planning of Cameroon 
Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sudan 
Head of Foreign Investment, African Union 
British supervisor of C9’s project in Sudan 
Former chief engineer of Jin Feng (a wind power  firm 
in China)  
2008  
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2013 
2014 
2013 
2014 
2013 
2013 
2008 
2008 
2008 
2009 
2009 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2014 
 
2009 
2008 
2014 
2008 
2015 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Cameroon 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Tanzania 
Emails/calls 
Tanzania 
Tanzania 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Sudan 
Kenya 
Cameroon 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia  
 
Cameroon 
Sudan 
Ethiopia 
Sudan 
China 
 
 
Notes: (1) This table includes the case studied Chinese firms in Africa’s infrastructure sector. (2) All cases but 
C16 and C18 are state owned. All were operating in more than one country. The far right column indicates the 
basic information of interviewees working in the case studied firm. (3) IV1-57 were interviewees working in the 
case studied CMNCs. IV58-85 were interviewees who were not in the case studied firms but provided 
information on them. (4) SH = subsidiary head.  
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Table 2 CMNCs’ knowledge origin  
Knowledge origin Applicable Cases 
Learning by doing in China  Yes for all cases 
Partners of DMNCs in China (e.g. being the partner of an IJV or strategic 
alliance with DMNCs or being a supplier of DMNCs) 
Yes for all the cases except 
for 2, 6, 8, 12,14, 18 
Opportunities of learning from DMNCs in China (e.g. applying technologies 
and equipment of DMNCs and hiring former DMNC employees) 
Yes for all cases 
Partners of DMNCs in host country (e.g. IJV, supplier, SA, etc) Yes for C9, 15, 16, 17, 19 
Opportunities of learning from DMNCs in host country (e.g. buying 
technologies and equipment, and hiring former DMNC employees ) 
Yes for all cases 
Learning by doing in host country Yes for all cases 
Note: The interview question was: “How did your company acquire current knowledge?” 
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Table 3 CMNCs’ knowledge transfer mechanisms 
Transfer mechanisms Applicable  cases 
Meetings and discussions between host and home participants in 
planning stage 
Yes for all the cases 
Host country partners visited completed and ongoing projects in China 
during planning and implementation stages  
Yes for all the cases 
CMNCs set up scholarships for locals to study in China and other 
countries 
Yes for C16, 17, 19.  
CMNCs offered formal training for recipients in college, forums, 
professional conferences etc 
Yes for C3, 4, 7, 14, 16, 
17, 19. 
CMNCs offered on site training for local staff Yes for all cases. 
CMNCs invited international consultants, project managers, designers 
etc to help to reach international standard and further assist knowledge 
transfer to African recipients  
Yes for all cases. 
Recipients’ participation in the projects at senior level (as supervisors, 
engineers, inspectors, senior managers) 
Yes for C1, 3, 4, 14, 16, 
17, 19.  
Recipients’ participation in the projects at middle level Yes for all. 
Recipients’ participation in the projects at lower level (e.g. over half of 
the employees are locals) 
Yes for all. 
Recipients’ established dedicated knowledge transfer program along 
with the project 
Yes for C3, 4, 14, 16, 17, 
19  
Note: The interview question was: “How was the CMNC’s knowledge transferred to the local operation?”  
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Table 4 What knowledge created CMNCs’ competitive advantage 
Knowledge Applicable cases 
Better meet local demand (e.g. offer highly demanded 
project/product)  
Responded as “the most important” for all the 
cases 
Lower cost (e.g. bidding price is lower)  Responded as the second most important for all 
the cases 
Fast delivery (e.g. less delay; quicker to finish the 
project) 
Responded as “also important” for all the cases  
Better fit local conditions (e.g. find local alternative 
resource/approach) 
Responded as “also important” for all the cases  
Suitable technology for the project Responded as “also important” for all the cases  
Note: The interview question was: “What kind of knowledge is most important in creating the competitive 
advantage of your company (the CMNC)?”  
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Table 5 CMNCs’ knowledge characteristics and their relevance to recipient’s knowledge 
Characteristics 
(comparison to superior 
knowledge) 
Applicable 
Cases 
Typical quotes Relevance to 
recipient’s 
knowledge 
Applicability 
able to provide modified 
and customised products 
and services through 
second-innovation in a new 
context using local-fit 
solutions. 
(contrast to superior 
knowledge’s “originality”: 
advanced techniques 
providing  goods and 
services not previously 
available in market ) 
All “Last decade China learnt from the Europe in 
wind power technology and has done so many 
such wind power plants at lower cost in 
China” (IV79). “We must become the Toyota 
of the telecommunication industry, i.e. we do 
not aim for the best technology but the most 
practical technology. For example, we 
researched and produced generators using 
solar power because Africa is short of energy 
but rich in solar power” (IV38). “we added  
small functions such as radio. It only raised 
the cost by $1-2 per set, but local customers 
loved it” (IV47).  “Whatever exists locally, 
we use that” (IV8). 
Ensures most 
efficient way to 
meet local 
product/services 
needs with 
immediately 
available skills 
and materials 
 
Assimilability 
shaped for ease of 
acquisition, overcoming 
comprehension and 
conflicting-interest barriers, 
and exploit 
complementarities with 
existing knowledge. 
(contrast to “dissimilarity”: 
shaped around novelty  
reforming or replacing  
existing knowledge, 
requiring substantial new 
learning or re-learning) 
All “After failure to communicate in language, 
we made a model for the local staff, so they 
use the model as a standard to measure their 
work” (IV7). “We asked the Chinese 
employees to demonstrate to skillful local 
employees first, and then the skillful ones will 
show the rest of the employees” (IV8).  
“Ministry of Energy of Ethiopia dispatched a 
lecturer of Addis Ababa University to be our 
project consultant, who brought a small team 
to the project site. For every step of our 
operation, he asked us in detail what that step 
was and what the principle was behind that 
step. He then wrote down in detail into the 
handbook” (IV31). 
Lessens the gap 
between 
provider and 
recipient 
knowledge 
bases, enhancing 
cooperation and 
knowledge 
absorption 
Affordability 
able to provide higher 
value-price ratio, cost 
savings in installing and 
running new operations, and  
more effective products and 
services. 
(contrast to “advancement”: 
able to provide  new and 
high quality products and 
services with price kept high 
by production cost and/or 
intellectual property 
premium) 
All “The quality is good and the price is the best” 
(IV75). “We meet the same criteria [in 
quality] but our bidding price is 20% -50% of 
the DMNCs” (IV64). “For this dam 
renovation project funded by Japan, France, 
Germany and Arabic Trust, French company 
Soja’s bid price was $50m, we bid at $32m. 
We still made a good profit from it” (IV18). 
“Lower cost is made from our lower salary, 
lower cost equipment and logistic, and many 
more. Mind set is also important. Project 
planning needs to be flexible. For instance, if 
necessary, the workers are requested to work 
over hours to complete a project so as to 
avoid time and material being wasted due to 
the work shift change”(IV10). 
Delivers 
urgently needed 
infrastructure in 
shortest feasible 
timeframe with 
limited 
resources, 
reduces cost of 
education/trainin
g needed for 
project 
replication 
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Table 6 The contribution of this study to existing theories 
 
Key elements 
in a KT 
process 
Extant theories 
with the focus of 
DMNCs 
This study with 
the focus of 
EMNCs 
The contributions of this study to extant theories 
Knowledge 
provider 
Knowledge 
originator 
Knowledge 
moderator 
It contributes to KT theory by examining EMNCs as 
a new knowledge provider, arguing that a knowledge 
mediator role is important for KT in emerging 
markets 
Knowledge Superior 
knowledge; 
DMNCs achieve 
competitive 
advantage by 
transferring 
superior 
knowledge to 
recipients 
Relevant 
knowledge; 
EMNCs achieve 
competitive 
advantage by 
creating relevant 
knowledge with 
recipients 
It contributes to KT and MNC competitiveness 
theories by identifying the relevant knowledge with 
characteristics of applicability, assimilability and 
affordability (3As) and arguing that the relevance of 
transferred knowledge matters more than its 
superiority for emerging markets 
KT mode Linear;  
teaching-learning 
Interactive;  
recipient 
ownership 
It contributes to KT theory by examining how an 
interactive model is more suitable for KT in 
emerging markets 
Recipient Passive learner 
being requested to 
improve 
absorptive 
capacity 
Active learner 
exerting 
recipient 
ownership 
It contributes to KT and absorptive capacity theories 
by identifying the recipient ownership with 
characteristics of selection, scrutiny and synthesis 
(3Ss) and arguing that recipient ownership not only 
contributes to the creation of relevant knowledge and 
improve the KT process but also enhances the 
recipient’s capacity and incentive to learn 
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Figure 1 EMNCs’ KT in emerging markets: a “relevant knowledge recipient ownership 
model” (within large rectangle) 
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P1: KT depends on relevant 
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P2: Greater relevance depends 
on greater applicability, 
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ownership 
P4: Stronger ownership means 
stronger selection, scrutiny, synthesis 
P5: Recipient ownership reinforces 
provider and recipient’s capacity and 
incentive for relevant KT 
 
Knowledge transfer outcome 
P7: EMNCs’ competitive advantage arises 
from knowledge relevance   
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P6: KT depends on 
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